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ABSTRACT: Is the trend towards rising earnings inequality associated 
with increased exploitation? The authors investigate exploitation among 
workers using data for manufacturing industries. Defined as the under-
payment of earnings relative to productivity as evaluated in the market, 
exploitation is measured for various groups of employees. The results 
indicate significant levels of exploitation among women, Hispanics, African 
Americans, and blue-collar workers. By contrast, employees who are 
overpaid relative to their productivities include middle-aged workers, older 
workers, and managers. Additional findings suggest that the increase in 
inequality in recent years has been associated with heightened exploitation 
due to the underpayment of workers in the lowest two quintiles of the 
earnings distribution, while workers in the upper two quintiles have become 
increasingly overpaid. Rising earnings inequality in the manufacturing 
sector thus appears to be associated with increased exploitation when 
the latter is measured as the underpayment of market value to workers. 
A related analysis by Liu, Sakamoto, and Su also investigates patterns of 
economic underpayment and overpayment but does not link them explicitly 
to inequality in the distribution of earnings and how the level of inequality 
has been increasing in recent years.
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In an era of expanding inequalities, the failure to empirically measure exploita-
tion remains a major—albeit rarely acknowledged—shortcoming of the study of 
social stratification (Kim and Sakamoto 2008a). Although ignored in contempo-
rary sociology, the empirical investigation of exploitation is critically important. 
In addition to being relevant to public policy debates, exploitation is theoretically 
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significant in regard to the long-standing sociological concern for understanding 
the nature and consequences of inequality (Sørensen 2000; Wright 2000). If the 
higher earnings of some workers primarily reflect their greater efforts, skills, and 
consequent productivity, then the implications of this trend are much different 
than if it derives from monopolistic advantages that some employees utilize to 
extract salaries that are substantially higher than their productivities. Despite its 
importance, exploitation has not been adequately investigated by any sociologist 
using statistical data since the time of Karl Marx. 
In the following, we derive and empirically investigate a measure of exploita-
tion using data for U.S. manufacturing industries from 1971 to 1996. We define 
exploitation as the extent to which the earnings of various groups in the labor force 
are underpaid relative to the market value of their productivities. The primary 
substantive issue that we address is whether rising earnings inequality in the U.S. 
manufacturing sector is associated with increased exploitation. In order to illus-
trate how the empirical study of exploitation intersects with other major topics in 
social stratification, we extend our analysis to estimate variations in the level of 
exploitation across labor market groups defined in terms of gender, race, ethnicity, 
age, education, marital status, and occupational category.
In addition to developing an appropriate methodology, our more general objective 
is to spur further research on exploitation by demonstrating how its empirical investi-
gation is entirely feasible as well as sociologically informative. More empirical research 
about exploitation is needed not only because it would provide additional findings 
about the sources of exploitation as operationalized here but also because other useful 
measures may be developed in the future by building upon our approach. In short, 
exploitation is an empirical phenomenon that is worthy of objective investigation.
THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR A MEASURE OF EXPLOITATION
As discussed by Sakamoto and Liu (2006), different types of exploitation may be 
conceptualized that are not mutually exclusive. For this reason, different measures 
of exploitation may ultimately prove to be useful for empirical research. Just as 
there are different dimensions and measures of educational attainment, political 
attitudes, and family relations, several indicators of exploitation may eventually 
be needed. Our measure is not the only conceivable approach.
The concept of exploitation should be distinguished from the processes that are 
hypothesized to generate it. Recent debates have reached an intellectual quagmire. 
Sociologists concur that exploitation is an extremely important topic, but disagree-
ments about its causes have dissuaded its empirical analysis. We caution against 
dismissing an intrinsically informative measure of exploitation on the grounds 
that it is not clearly identified with a broader theory. Systematic measurement typ-
ically precedes the scientific study of causal processes.
Measuring Exploitation in the Labor Market
A basic definition of exploitation is being paid less than the value of what one 
produces because someone else obtains the difference without providing adequate 
compensation for it. As stated by Sørensen (2000:1532), “exploitation is a question 
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of economic advantage obtained at the expense of someone else.” The essential 
idea is the payment of wages that, for a given time period, are less than the value 
added by workers because part of it is being diverted to another group of people 
who are benefiting from the appropriation. This generic definition seems broadly 
applicable to different descriptions of exploitation, although a consensus has yet to 
emerge regarding how to conceptualize the “value of what one produces” (Saka-
moto and Liu 2006).
Modern capitalism is characterized by an extensive division of labor and com-
plex production processes. In contrast to the production systems of pre-industrial 
societies in which an individual worker often produced much of the product that 
is sold or consumed, an individual worker in contemporary capitalism typically 
performs only a tiny subset of the total activities that are required in order to real-
ize the sale of the product. The economic “value of what one produces” is difficult 
to measure at the level of the individual worker whose particular job activities 
alone do not yield a salable commodity.
In this context, we use a factors-of-production methodology to analyze the cre-
ation and measurement of economic value. This approach is appropriate because 
it recognizes the contributions of all of the various factors of production (i.e., capi-
tal, industry-specific technology, material supplies, energy costs, and the labor of 
different types of employees including managers) that are involved in the real-
ization of the sale of the product which is a reasonable and direct indicator of its 
value. Our factors-of-production methodology uses data to empirically estimate 
the multivariate relationships between the value created and the quantities of the 
various inputs utilized in the production process.
Drawing upon contemporary economics, the marginal revenue product of a fac-
tor of production (e.g., capital or some type of labor) refers to the value added by 
that input given some level of output. In the case of a particular type of labor, the 
marginal revenue product refers to the revenue that is obtained from the sale of 
the additional product that is produced as the result of additional hours worked 
by that type of labor after taking into account the quantities of the other inputs that 
are used in the production process. This approach considers the total value of the 
output of the firm as a dependent variable that is determined by the quantities of 
the various factors of production including capital investments and specific types 
of labor input. The “value of what is produced by labor,” on a per-unit basis, is 
then defined as the increment in the total output value that accrues by employing 
another unit of labor of a particular type, holding constant the other factors of pro-
duction by way of the multivariate production function (i.e., the marginal revenue 
product for the given type of labor). Being based on aggregate data, however, this 
methodology identifies only averages at the level of the group and should not be 
construed to refer to any particular individual worker per se.
We then define exploitation as the underpayment of a particular category of 
workers relative to its marginal revenue product. That is, when the earnings for a 
given group of employees is less than their value added, then the difference between 
these two quantities represents an underpayment that we define as exploitation. 
Exploitation would not exist (i.e., it would be equal to zero) were the earnings for 
this group of workers equal to its value added (i.e., its marginal revenue product). 
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Conversely, some categories of employees may actually receive earnings in excess 
of their marginal revenue products and may therefore be defined as exploiters in 
that they benefit by obtaining some of the excess surplus that is generated by the 
exploitation of others.
In adopting this approach, we need not make any assumptions about which 
groups of employees may be overpaid. Our analysis can empirically identify which 
groups (if any) may receive some of the surplus generated by the exploitation of 
some types of workers. This approach contrasts with the Marxist view that begins 
with the theoretical assumption that only capitalists benefit from exploitation and 
that no groups of employees can ever be exploitative (Wright 2000).
Exploitation and Rising Inequality in the Labor Market
Wage and earnings inequalities have been notably increasing in recent decades, 
leading to a “polarization of the labor market” (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2006:189). 
In this era of expanding inequality in the labor market, a measure of exploitation 
should not rule out the possibility that some groups of employees may be over-
paid, thus benefitting from the exploitation of other groups of workers. Spiraling 
income increases for privileged employees with greater bargaining power may be 
depleting revenues for less advantaged workers. 
Inequality associated with profits is severe (Liu, Sakamoto, and Su Forthcom-
ing), but the existence of capital incomes should not lead us to dismiss the potential 
for exploitation that is associated with earnings. Although the share of the national 
income that is represented by wages and salaries has declined slightly in recent 
years, most of the gross domestic product still consists of employee compensa-
tion (Dietzenbacker, Lahr, and Los 2004). Even among the wealthiest 1 percent of 
households in 1998, wages and salaries represent the single largest component of 
their incomes (Piketty and Saez 2003:16).
The Broader Theoretical Context
Sociologists have not investigated exploitation in regard to earnings inequal-
ity in part because this issue is not an obvious topic in classical theory. Weber 
never developed a concept of exploitation nor is it inherent in Durkheim’s func-
tionalist view of stratification. Although exploitation is a central theme in Marx-
ist theory, it does not consider exploitation in the distribution of labor earnings 
(Sakamoto and Liu 2006). Marxist theory instead focuses on capital income and 
profits because exploitation is defined to occur between the major classes (i.e., not 
within them).
In studying exploitation as the underpayment of earnings relative to the market 
value of the productivity of a given group of workers, our investigation is more 
consistent with Weber’s view of class as “market situation” that affects one’s ac-
cess to scarce societal resources and “life chances.” We analyze how exploitation 
results in the underpayment of earnings, which reduces the “life chances” of a 
given group of workers, and how the degree of the underpayment is typically 
influenced by their “market situation.” 
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Although aspects of Weber’s views on social stratification may be broadly com-
patible with micro-economics, Weber’s understanding of class as “market situa-
tion” envisions an economy that greatly differs from the characterization of “per-
fect competition” as commonly assumed by economists. Weber ([1922] 1978:342) 
acknowledges that “market situation” typically includes aspects of market 
closure, which “is directed against competitors who share some positive or 
negative characteristics; its purpose is always the closure of social and economic 
opportunities to outsiders” and “curbing competition.” His approach analyzes 
how institutions promote the interests of various classes and social groups in 
their efforts to improve their employment circumstances by fostering market clo-
sure of various sorts (Murphy 1988). Market closure is most commonly thought 
of as being associated with monopolistic sellers, but other possible sources may 
include taxes, price controls and supports, cartels, labor unions, occupational cer-
tification practices, licensing, various imperfections of knowledge surrounding 
consumption and production, product differentiation, economies of scale, and 
patents (Sørensen 2000). 
Weber’s perspective on social stratification permits the differentiation of groups 
of workers who have varying degrees of power in their “market situation” to ex-
tract higher wages (Weber [1922] 1978:341–43). In contrast to the Marxist model of 
the struggle between two oppositional classes, Weber’s concept of class as “market 
situation” is compatible with the idea that exploitative economic relations can be 
generated by processes relating to market closure affecting economic actors in the 
same class category. Our investigation of exploitation is consistent with Weber’s 
general perspective on social stratification.
More recently, Sørensen’s (2000) view of exploitation also recognizes the im-
portance of market closure, which is included in his broader concept of rent. Our 
approach differs from his formulation, however, because Sørensen (2000:1536) 
proposes to define exploitation as being relative to the earnings that would be ob-
tained in a perfectly competitive economy. By contrast, we measure exploitation as 
the difference between observed earnings and productivity as actually valued in 
the existing market. Because a perfectly competitive economy does not really exist 
in any known society, operationalizing Sørensen’s view would be highly ambigu-
ous if not untenable (Goldthorpe 2000; Wright 2000). 
In sum, our foregoing methodology to measure exploitation provides intrinsi-
cally important information about economic underpayment as an ongoing process 
reflecting observed differentials between earnings and productivities as they are 
currently evaluated in the market economy. Although more conceptually concor-
dant with the sociology of Weber, our approach is nonetheless consistent with the 
esprit of Marx’s theory because exploitation is viewed as being inherently linked 
to the actual labor process, which creates value that is partially appropriated as 
that process of antagonistic relations unfolds; or as stated by Wright (2000:1565), 
“exploitation depends upon the appropriation of labor effort.” Our measure 
of exploitation provides inherently meaningful information about the extent to 
which the labor process results in the appropriation of value that is directly in-
dicative of the augmentation of actual inequalities, which again fulfills the intent 
of the Marxist vision. 
SOP5301_03.indd   23 3/2/10   2:00:36 PM
24 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES Volume 53, Number 1, 2010
TOWARDS A THEORY OF THE SOURCES OF EXPLOITATION
Our investigation is inherently preliminary in nature. We therefore do not advo-
cate a particular coherent theory of the sources of exploitation. We instead develop 
a methodology that future researchers may utilize so as to advance cumulative 
knowledge about the various determinants of exploitation. In this context, we 
identify several relevant variables that prior literature suggests should be investi-
gated as potentially significant factors.
One often cited factor is occupational structure (Grusky 2005). Even Marxist 
formulations that seek to differentiate themselves from the Weberian perspective 
nonetheless utilize occupational categories as key concepts in their theoretical 
framework albeit in terms of a more esoteric nomenclature (Wright 2000). As dis-
cussed by Grusky (2005:61), “occupational groupings have emerged as the ele-
mentary building blocks of modern and postmodern labor markets.” Furthermore, 
“the working institutions of closure are organized largely at the occupational level 
and the potential for rent therefore emerges at that level” (Grusky 2005:74). 
Demographic and ascribed sources of inequality have also been studied by soci-
ologists. These patterns of wage differentials often stem from various discrimina-
tory practices towards women and racial/ethnic minorities. In terms of the Webe-
rian approach, some of these practices serve to weaken the “market situation” of 
women and racial/ethnic minorities. As noted by Weber ([1922] 1978:342), “one 
group of competitors takes some externally identifiable characteristic of another 
group of (actual or potential) competitors—race, language, religion, local or social 
origin, descent, residence, etc.—as a pretext for attempting their exclusion.”
In regard to the wage penalty for women, prior research has emphasized the 
significance of gender segregation into lower level jobs (Jacobs 2001). This segrega-
tion is often exacerbated by reduced chances for upward mobility and promotions 
within firms (Petersen and Morgan 1995). Gender segregation may lead to com-
parative worth processes that tend to “de-value” jobs that are labeled as “women’s 
work,” thus leading to the underpayment of those jobs relative to their actual pro-
ductivities (England, Thompson, and Aman 2001). The labor market competitive-
ness of women may be further disadvantaged by family relations (Marini and Fan 
1997) including household migration patterns (McKinnish 2008) and motherhood 
(Budig and England 2001; Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007). 
In terms of race and ethnicity, labor market discrimination against African 
Americans has been documented. Discriminatory attitudes and queuing processes 
result in hiring disadvantages (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Kaufman 2001). 
Human capital development and career mobility are often hampered (Tomask-
ovic-Devey, Thomas, and Johnson 2005). Labor market segmentation and racial 
segregation in employment may further reduce the returns to human capital for 
African Americans (Kaufman 2001). Pre-labor market discrimination particularly 
in regard to residential segregation, educational opportunity, and lower socioeco-
nomic background represent additional disadvantages (Massey and Denton 1993). 
Though on a somewhat lesser scale, similar labor market processes may operate 
for Hispanics (Kaufman 2001).
In regard to educational attainment, prior research indicates that manufacturing 
firms with more highly educated employees tend to have greater productivity net 
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of other variables (Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske 1999:428). This result is con-
sistent with either the human capital or the market-signaling explanations of the 
effect of education (Hellerstein et al. 1999:433). For our purposes, either explana-
tion (or some combination of the two) justifies the inclusion of education into our 
models because one’s “market situation” is clearly enhanced whether schooling 
improves one’s productivity or whether it signals to prospective employers that 
one is a more trainable worker.
Marital status is another labor market factor that may be significant because 
married persons may have greater preferences for higher earnings and at least 
married men tend to have higher earnings as well (Croson and Gneezy 2009; Hel-
lerstein et al. 1999; Johnson 2005). In addition to higher earnings, married persons 
in the manufacturing sector also seem to have slightly greater productivity (Hel-
lerstein et al. 1999). Age is another demographic factor that is often correlated with 
the development of work skills as well as position in career hierarchies (Sørensen 
1977). A quadratic specification for age is typically used.
The aforementioned studies indicate that these traditional sources of inequality— 
including occupation, gender, race, ethnicity, education, marital status, and age—
may be associated with exploitation by lowering earnings in the labor market. 
Although prior research on these variables is voluminous, most previous studies 
typically assume that the lower earnings associated with these variables do not 
simply derive from lower levels of productivity. In the following, we are able to as-
sess this assumption more explicitly by estimating a model that uses information 
on both productivity and earnings differentials. 
METHODOLOGY
Data
We limit this investigation to the manufacturing sector because it is generally 
viewed as having more valid productivity data (Kim and Sakamoto 2008b). Another 
rationale for this restriction is simply data availability since productivity statistics 
for other sectors have not been collected until very recently. Due to this restriction, 
our results obviously cannot be generalized beyond the manufacturing sector.
Our key data source that provides annual information on productivity and other 
related factors for manufacturing industries is the Manufacturing Industry Data-
base (NBER-CES MID), which is compiled by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research and the Center for Economic Studies of the U.S. Census Bureau. These 
data are obtained from various official sources, most notably the Annual Survey 
of Manufactures and the Census of Manufactures. This database extends through 
1996 and our analysis thus ends with that year.
However, this database does not provide any information on workers’ charac-
teristics in each manufacturing industry. We therefore use the NBER-CES MID in 
conjunction with other annual data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). 
We investigate the CPS beginning with 1971 because of its consistent use of oc-
cupational and industrial codes that are based on the 1970 Census Bureau clas-
sification. Workers’ characteristics are summarized in terms of the proportions 
observed for various demographic and socioeconomic categories (i.e., gender, race, 
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occupational category, educational level, etc.) in each manufacturing industry for 
each year.
We matched the NBER-CES MID data on productivity (and other related factors) 
and the CPS data on workers’ characteristics on the basis of three-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. That is, our unit of analysis is the three-digit 
SIC code. At this aggregate level, productivity (i.e., the dollar value of the total out-
put of a manufacturing industry during a given year) and workers’ characteristics 
(i.e., the proportions observed on various variables for the workers in a manufac-
turing industry during a given year) are linked for each three-digit SIC code in 
each year. We thereby obtained a balanced panel data set that includes 1,456 cases 
consisting of 56 manufacturing industries observed annually from 1971 to 1996. 
Statistical Models
Using the aggregate data set described above, two regression equations are esti-
mated in which the unit of analysis is the three-digit SIC code whose scores on the 
variables vary annually over time. The dependent variable for the first regression 
is productivity, and the independent variables include the proportions indicating 
the various characteristics of workers in that industry during a given year. The 
second regression equation is also estimated using this data set, but in this case 
the dependent variable is the total earnings paid to all workers in the particular 
industry during a given year. The independent variables for the second regression 
include the exact same worker characteristics that were used as independent vari-
ables in the first regression.
Using this model, exploitation can be ascertained as occurring to those groups 
of workers for whom their incremental contribution to total productivity is less 
than their incremental association with total earnings. Workers are being under-
paid relative to their value when their earnings do not reflect the increase in total 
productivity that results from their employment. They are exploited because they 
are not receiving the full economic value of their work. 
The first regression of total productivity is the production function. Following 
standard practice, this regression is specified as a Cobb-Douglas model:
 Vit = AKit
aLit
b (1)
where A is a constant reflecting the scaling of the measures and Vit is productivity 
at time t in industry i. Productivity here refers to the value added or the market 
value of the output produced minus energy and material costs. Kit refers to the 
total value of the real capital stock that is used in production at time t in industry i. 
Lit refers to the total number of workers employed at time t by industry i. 
The Cobb-Douglas production function is widely used because it has gener-
ally been confirmed in prior studies that the relationship between total output 
and total input typically involves interaction effects between the various factors of 
production. This latter property is built into the Cobb-Douglas specification due to 
its multiplicative formulation (Stolzenberg and Land 1983). The coefficients of this 
model may be interpreted as elasticities, which refer to “the proportional change 
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in Y [i.e., the dependent variable] per proportionate change in X [i.e., a given inde-
pendent variable]” (Stolzenberg and Land 1983:652).
To investigate the effects of workers’ characteristics on productivity, we substi-
tute Lit for Qit, which refers to the various variables computed for the workers in 
each industry. To illustrate this method, suppose that the workforce characteristic 
being considered is gender composition. Dropping the time and industry subscripts 
for simplicity, Qit can then be expressed by equation 2: 
 Q = L[1 + (d1 – 1) LF/L] = L [1 + (d1 – 1) F] (2)
where L refers to the total number of workers in an industry and LF refers to the 
number of female workers. F denotes the proportion of female workers among all 
workers. d1 refers to the relative marginal productivity associated with employing 
female workers (as compared to employing male workers). For example, when d1 
is equal to unity, then L [1 + (d1 – 1)F] becomes L because (1 – 1)F reduces to zero. 
This result would indicate that employing more female workers is associated with 
the same increase in productivity as employing more male workers.
The actual labor input specification that we use is:
Q =  L × [1 + (d1 – 1)F] × [1 + (d2 – 1)M] × [1 + (d3 – 1)Am + (d4 – 1)Ao]  
× [1 + (d5 – 1)R1 + (d6 – 1)R2 + (d7 – 1)R3] × [1 + (d8 – 1)E]  
× [1 + (d9 – 1)O1 + (d10 – 1)O2 + (d11 – 1)O3 + (d12 – 1)O4 + (d13 – 1)O5] (3)
where F denotes the percent female, M denotes the percent married, Am refers to 
the percent of employees who are middle-aged (i.e., thirty-five to fifty four years 
old), and Ao refers to the percent of employees who are older (i.e., fifty-five or more 
years of age). For these age groups, the reference category is young workers aged 
eighteen to thirty-four. R1 to R3 denote the percents in different mutually exclusive 
racial/ethnic groups (i.e., non-Hispanic African Americans, Hispanics, and other 
non-Hispanic nonwhites) with non-Hispanic whites being the reference category. 
E refers to the percent of employees who have a college degree or some higher 
degree. O1 to O5 refer to the percents in different occupational categories, including 
professionals, managers, technicians (e.g., draftsmen, pilots, medical technicians, 
dental assistants, etc.), blue-collar workers (including craft workers, operatives, and 
laborers), and sales or service workers. The reference group for the occupational 
categories is other white-collar workers (including administrative support occupa-
tions such as secretaries). These variables for the labor input function follow from 
our earlier discussion regarding the sources of inequality and market closure.
After inserting Q (as given by equation 3) for L in equation 1, we take the log on 
both sides of the resulting equation to transform it into its additive form:
ln(V) =  c + a ln(K) + b {ln(L) + ln[1 + (d1 – 1)F] + ln[1 + (d2 – 1)M]  
+ ln[1 + (d3 – 1)Am + (d4 – 1)Ao] + ln[1 + (d5 – 1)R1 + (d6 – 1)R2  
+ (d7 – 1)R3] + ln[1 + (d8 – 1)E3] + ln[1 + (d9 – 1)O1 + (d10 – 1)O2  
+ (d11 – 1)O3 + (d12 – 1)O4 + (d13 – 1)O5]} + Ii + T + INDTi + e (4)
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where e refers to the residual error and a refers to the expected percent increase 
in value added by a 1 percent increase in capital (i.e., a is an elasticity) holding 
labor input constant. b denotes the expected percent increase in valued added by 
a 1 percent increase in labor input holding capital constant. Following up on our 
discussion above, the dj in equation 4 refers to the differential marginal productiv-
ity between the reference group and the jth group. When dj is equal to unity for the 
jth group, then its productivity is equal to that of the reference group. Conversely, 
when dj is less than unity for the jth group, then its productivity is less than that of 
the reference group while a dj greater than unity indicates that the productivity of 
the jth group is greater than the reference group.
Even after taking the log on both sides, equation 4 cannot be estimated with 
ordinary least squares (OLS) because the components of labor input (e.g., ln[1 + 
(d1 – 1) F]) are not linearly related. The total error associated with the estimation of 
the regression model cannot be directly minimized using the standard OLS solu-
tions. We therefore estimate equation 4 using a nonlinear least squares method.
Equation 4 includes dummy variables to control for industry (i.e., Ii), an interval-
level variable to control for time (i.e., T) in terms of an annual increment, and in-
teractions between industry and time (i.e., INDTi). By adding the industry dummy 
variables, we control for industry-specific fixed-effects in the production function. 
Our estimates are free from cross-sectional heterogeneity between industries. The 
estimated parameters indicate net changes in productivity within industries ac-
cording to their changes in capital and labor-input over time. The time variable 
(which is centered at 1971) controls for annual technological and other period 
changes during these years while the interaction terms between industry and time 
control for the heterogeneity in these changes across the industries. 
The other regression in our statistical model is an earnings function, which re-
fers to the total annual earnings paid to all employees in a given industry during 
a particular year. The covariates for the earnings function are the same as those for 
the production function. The variables to control for the industry-specific fixed ef-
fects, year, and the interactions between industry and time are also included. They 
control for other changes in the “market situation” of industries such as declining 
unionization, increasing global competition, and altering legal regulations over 
this time period (Kim and Sakamoto 2008c). Although capital is usually thought 
of as being an independent variable in a production function, capital is included 
in the earnings function because prior research suggests that workers in industries 
with greater capital investment receive slightly higher wages (Dickens and Katz 
1987). Our earnings function is thus specified as:
ln(E) =  c + a ln(K) + b {ln(L) + ln[1 + (z1 – 1)F] + ln[1 + (z2 – 1)M]  
+ ln[1 + (z3 – 1)Am+ (z4 – 1)Ao] + ln[1 + (z5 – 1)R1 + (z6 – 1)R2  
+ (z7 – 1)R3] + ln[1 + (z8 – 1)E1] + ln[1 + (z9 – 1)O1 + (z10 – 1)O2  
+ (z11 – 1)O3 + (z12 – 1)O4 + (z13 – 1)O5]} + Ii + T + INDTi + e (5)
where ln(E) refers to log total annual earnings paid to all employees in a particular 
industry during a given year. The z’s in equation 5 represent the relative marginal 
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earnings in comparison to the relevant reference group after controlling for the 
other variables in the equation. If all of these groups of workers are paid equally 
(net of the other covariates in the model), then all of the z’s will be equal to unity. 
Deviations from unity indicate earnings differentials. 
Estimating the Level of Exploitation for Particular Groups of Workers
As explained above, when a particular group has a higher relative marginal 
productivity compared to the reference group (on average), then its d will be 
greater than one, while in the opposite case, it will be less than one. When a par-
ticular group has higher earnings compared to the reference group (on average), 
then its z will be greater than one, while in the opposite case, it will be less than 
one. When workers of a particular category are paid exactly according to their 
marginal productivities (on average), then there should be no difference between 
d and z for that group.
To assess whether a particular group of workers is exploited, we test whether 
it is underpaid in that its marginal contribution to productivity (i.e., d) is greater 
than its earnings differential (i.e., z). If the d for a given group of workers is greater 
than its z, then we conclude that this group is exploited by the degree of the dif-
ference. The statistical significance of the estimated difference may be assessed 
using a Wald test that follows a chi-square sampling distribution with 1 degree of 
freedom according to the null hypothesis of equality between d and z.
When the marginal productivity of a particular group of workers is less than 
its earnings, then its d will be less than its corresponding z’. In this case, the given 
group of workers is benefiting from the exploitation of other groups of workers or 
is obtaining rewards that the other groups of workers may not be receiving. In ei-
ther case, we refer to this given group of workers as being exploiters because they 
extract from the market more than their marginal productivity.
Our methodology estimates group-level differentials on average as evidenced in 
variation across industries. Our results therefore do not identify any individual-level 
relationships. In reality, our findings may perhaps sometimes be indicative of simi-
lar individual-level relationships, but extrapolating to the individual-level should be 
recognized as an interpretation imputed by a researcher (presumably on the basis of 
other information from other studies that do use individual-level data).
Investigating Exploitation by Relative Position in the Distribution of Earnings
We next estimate the following production function in order to investigate ex-
ploitation by relative position in the distribution of earnings:
ln(V) =  c + a ln(K) + b {ln(L) + ln[1 + (d14 – 1)Q1 +(d15 – 1)Q2  
+ (d16 – 1)Q4 + (d17 – 1)Q5]} + Ii + T + INDTi + e (6)
where Q1 refers to the percent of workers in the given industry during a particular 
year that are being paid in the first quintile of earnings (from the lowest value 
to the 20th percentile), where the latter cutoff is determined on the basis of the 
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distribution of earnings for the entire manufacturing sector during that year. Simi-
larly, Q2 refers to the second quintile (from the 20th percentile to the 40th percentile 
for the manufacturing sector in a given year), Q4 refers to the fourth quintile (from 
the 60th percentile to the 80th percentile for the manufacturing sector in a given 
year), and Q5 refers to the highest quintile (greater than the 80th
 percentile for 
the manufacturing sector in a given year). Workers in the higher quintiles have a 
higher relative position in the distribution of earnings in a given year.
Because the cutoffs for the quintiles are based on the distribution of earnings 
for the entire manufacturing sector during a particular year, the independent vari-
ables in equation 6 indicate how equal (or unequal) the distribution of earnings 
is for a given industry during that year as compared to the national average for 
this sector. If a given industry in a particular year had exactly the same level of 
earnings inequality as the manufacturing sector as a whole, then the values on its 
Q’s would be exactly 20 percent each. If a given industry in a particular year were 
more unequal than the national average, then more of its workers (i.e., greater than 
20 percent) would be concentrated in the lower and higher quintiles.
In equation 6, the reference group is the third quintile (from the 40th percentile 
to the 60th percentile for the manufacturing sector in a given year). The d’s in this 
specification refer to the marginal productivity of workers in a particular earn-
ings quintile relative to workers in the third earnings quintile. To the extent that 
workers in the fourth and fifth quintiles contribute more to productivity than do 
the workers in the third quintile, then the d’s should be greater than unity for the 
fourth and fifth quintiles.
The earnings function that is associated with equation 6 is:
ln(E) =  c + a ln(K) + b {ln(L) + ln[1 + (z14 – 1)Q1 + (z15 – 1)Q2  
+ (z16 – 1)Q4 + (z17 – 1)Q5]} + e  (7)
where the reference category is again the third quintile as determined by the 40th 
and 60th percentiles for the manufacturing sector in a given year. In this model, 
the z’s refer to the relative earnings differentials between workers in a particular 
quintile as compared to workers in the third quintile. To the extent that the rela-
tive earnings differential for workers in a particular quintile is matched by a cor-
responding increase in its relative marginal productivity, then d should equal z, 
which can be again assessed with a Wald chi-square test. To the extent that the 
workers in a particular quintile are overpaid relative to their marginal productiv-
ity, however, then their z would be greater than their d. The latter case may be 
interpreted as exploitative because a given quintile group extracts earnings that 
are higher than its marginal productivity. 
The earnings function as shown by equation 7 does not include any of the vari-
ables for occupation, demography, capital investment, industry-specific fixed ef-
fects, or year. The rationale for these omissions is that equation 7 is not meant to be 
a causal model of how “market situation” affects earnings, but rather an equation 
that assesses an accounting relationship. The values of the Q’s represent the actual 
earnings outcomes of the bargaining process, so variables that predict the latter 
should not be included in the model.
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For a similar reason the production function as given by equation 6 does not 
include any variables for occupation and demographic characteristics. Workers 
identified by those variables may be located in different quintiles. The inclusion of 
variables to indicate occupation and demographic traits would have resulted in a 
specification in which the d’s do not refer to the total differentials in marginal pro-
ductivity associated on average with the employees in a given quintile. Equation 6 
does include, however, variables to indicate capital investment, industry-specific 
fixed effects, year, and their interactions. These latter variables are needed in order 
to control for differences in production functions across these industries and over 
this time period. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics. The data for value added, earnings, 
and capital investment are in terms of 1984 constant dollars. The mean of value 
added for these industries in the manufacturing sector increased substantially 
from $13,913 million in 1971 to $19,913 million in 1996, while the mean number 
of workers employed per industry actually declined slightly from 313,000 in 1971 
to 309,000 in 1996. These results suggest that manufacturing productivity per em-
ployee improved dramatically for this time period. However, mean earnings per 
employee increased only modestly from 1971 to 1996, as is evident in Table 1.
Table 1 shows that the proportion of female workers in the manufacturing sector 
increased during this time period. The share of Hispanics also grew substantially, 
while the share of non-Hispanic whites declined. The share of non-Hispanic others 
increased (largely reflecting the influx of Asians), while the share of non-Hispanic 
African Americans declined very slightly. Regarding educational composition, 
the proportion of workers with a college degree or higher educational attainment 
more than doubled from .085 in 1971 to .180 in 1996. The proportion of managerial 
workers grew substantially over this period from .059 to .101, while the share of 
blue-collar workers decreased from .685 to .628.
Productivity, Earnings, and Exploitation among Workers  
in the Manufacturing Sector
Table 2 shows the estimates for our multivariate models (i.e., equations 4 and 5) 
investigating the effects of demographic and occupational variables. As expected 
on the basis of prior research, both capital investment and labor input are clearly 
positive factors of production. A 1 percent increase of capital is predicted to raise 
value added by .05 percent (i.e., the estimate of a), which is net of the other co-
variates in the model. Net of capital, a 1 percent increase in labor input (holding 
constant the mix of worker categories and types) is expected to increase value 
added by .96 percent (i.e., the estimate of b). Both of these net effects are statisti-
cally significant at any conventional level. 
The estimates of the occupational and demographic variables show some varia-
tion in Table 2. In the productivity equation, the coefficient for female workers is .85, 
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TABLE 2








Wald Test  
(2) – (1)
Coeffi. [c2] Sig.
c 3.4498 *** 9.4512 ***  
               (.2022)  (.1166)   
a .0512 *** .0615 ***  
               (.0125)  (.0074)   
b .9610 *** .9858 ***  
               (.0334)  (.0105)   
Female .8549 * .4676 *** –.3873 ***
               (.0622)  (.0315)  [30.84]  
Agea  
Middle 1.0721  1.4667 *** .3946 ***
               (.0569)  (.0630)  [21.58]  
 Old .9135  1.3845 *** .4710 ***
               (.0955)  (.0946)  [12.29]  
Married 1.0082  1.1324 * .1242  
               (.0676)  (.0586)  [1.93]  
Raceb  
African American 1.2181 * .9883  –.2298  
               (.1033)  (.0701)  [3.39]  
 Hispanic .9864  .7007 *** –.2857 **
               (.0846)  (.0563)  [7.91]  
 Other 1.0974  1.0037  –.0937  
               (.1866)  (.1295)  [0.17]  
College or more education 1.1901 * 1.2684 *** .0783  
               (.0790)  (.0608)  [0.62]  
Occupationc  
Managers 1.1228  1.7777 *** .6549 **
               (.1823)  (.1516)  [7.63]  
 Professionals 1.1537  1.3044 * .1507  
               (.1818)  (.1262)  [0.46]  
 Technicians .9320  1.1148  .1828  
               (.2103)  (.1442)  [0.51]  
 Blue collar 1.1911  .8142 ** –.3770 *
               (.1381)  (.0627)  [6.18]  
 Service and sales 0.9308  .9957  .0649  
               (0.1925)  (.1257)  [0.08]  
Adjusted R2 .9891 .9946
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Time variable Yes Yes
Industry × Time interactions Yes Yes    
Note: Numbers within round brackets are standard errors and numbers within square brackets are chi-squares.
aYoung: aged 18–34; middle: aged 35–54; old: aged 55–65.
bReference group is white.
cReference group is other white-collar workers.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).
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indicating that industries that employ more female workers have 15 percent less 
productivity than industries employing more male workers. In other words, the 
marginal productivity associated with employing women in these results is 15 
percent less than that for men at least at the industrial level.1 The other coefficients 
that are statistically significant at the .05 level in the productivity equation include 
African American and college education attainment.2 The estimate for African 
Americans is 1.22, indicating that employing black workers results in 22 percent 
higher industrial productivity than employing white workers. The coefficient 
for educational attainment indicates that employing workers who have a college 
degree is associated with 19 percent higher industrial productivity than workers 
without a college degree.
None of the occupational variables are statistically significant at the .05 level in 
the productivity function for Table 2. These results do not provide strong evidence 
that the marginal productivity of any of these occupational categories exceeds that 
of the omitted category, which is other white-collar workers (at least for industrial-
level data for the manufacturing sector), net of education and demographic variables. 
These findings may perhaps derive from a substantial degree of heterogeneity 
within these broad occupational categories.
Several of the occupational variables are statistically significant, however, in the 
earnings equation in Table 2. Relative to other white-collar workers and net of 
the other variables in the model, the employment of managers is associated with 
about 78 percent higher earnings paid at the industrial level, while the employ-
ment of professionals is associated with about 30 percent higher earnings paid at 
the industrial level. On the other hand, the employment of blue-collar workers is 
associated with about 19 percent (i.e., 1.0 – .81) lower earnings paid at the indus-
trial level than is the employment of other white-collar workers. 
As for the demographic variables in the earnings equation in Table 2, the results 
indicate the following in regard to total earnings paid at the industrial level (net of 
the other variables in the model): 47 percent more for the employment of middle-
aged workers (compared to younger workers), 38 percent more for the employment 
of older workers (compared to younger workers), 13 percent more for the employ-
ment of married workers (compared to unmarried workers), 30 percent less for the 
employment of Hispanic workers (compared to white workers), and 53 percent less 
for the employment of female workers (compared to male workers).3
As was discussed earlier, we measure exploitation as the difference between 
productivity and earnings differentials for a particular group. For female workers, 
Table 2 shows that the Wald chi-square test statistic (i.e., 30.84) for their under-
payment is statistically significant at any conventional level. Although employing 
women is associated with 85 percent of the industrial productivity of employing 
men, women only earn 47 percent of what men earn. Thus, female workers are 
underpaid (i.e., exploited) by about 39 percent (i.e., 85.5 percent – 46.8 percent), as 
shown in the last column of Table 2. Net of the other factors controlled for in the 
model using industrial data, the productivity of female workers is underpaid by 39 
percent compared to the extent to which the productivity of male workers is paid.
Another exploited group is Hispanics. In Table 2, their d is estimated to be 
.99, while their z is estimated to be .70. The difference implies that Hispanics are 
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underpaid by 29 percent. Given a Wald chi-square test statistic of 7.91, this under-
payment at the industrial level is statistically significant at the .005 level.
The Wald chi-square test statistic is also significant for blue-collar workers. Al-
though their estimated d of 1.19 implies that they are associated with 19 percent 
more industrial productivity than other white-collar workers, the estimated z of 
.81 implies that blue-collar workers earn 19 percent less than other white-collar 
workers. These two estimates together imply that blue-collar workers are under-
paid by about 38 percent.
The Wald chi-square test statistic for the estimated difference between d and z 
for African Americans is 3.39, as shown in Table 2. This difference is not statisti-
cally significant at the .05 level, which has a critical value of 3.84. However, other 
research discussed above suggests that African Americans face discrimination in 
the labor force, and a chi-square test statistic of 3.39 implies a relatively close p 
value of .0656. We are therefore inclined to reject the null hypothesis that d and z 
are equal for African Americans. Given that conclusion, the estimated underpay-
ment for African Americans is 23 percent.
Other results in Table 2 indicate that several groups are exploiters. For middle-
aged workers and for older workers, the estimated d is less than the estimated z, 
and these differences are statistically significant at any conventional level. In the 
case of middle-aged workers (i.e., thirty-five to fifty-four years of age) the over-
payment amounts to 40 percent while for older workers (i.e., fifty-five or more 
years of age) the overpayment amounts to 47 percent. The other group of exploit-
ers is the managerial occupation. They have the highest level of overpayment, 
which amounts to 66 percent.
These estimates of differentials in productivity, earnings, and exploitation refer 
to proportionality contrasts relative to a particular reference category. We have not 
provided any specific estimates of the levels of productivity, earnings, and exploi-
tation for the reference groups per se because these quantities are not identified in 
these models. Our results about the levels of exploitation are relative to a particular 
reference group and do not imply that that reference group itself is not exploited 
as well.
Productivity, Earnings, and Exploitation by Relative Position  
in the Distribution of Earnings
Table 3 shows the estimates of the functions for industrial productivity and 
earnings by relative position in the distribution of earnings. In order to investigate 
whether the level of exploitation has been increasing over this time period, the 
model is estimated twice. First, it is estimated using only the data for the earlier 
years (i.e., 1971 to 1982). Then it is estimated using only the data for the later years 
(i.e., 1983 to 1996).
We chose this cutoff for several reasons. First, it yields two periods with an 
approximately similar number of years, which yields greater statistical power. 
Second, in 1983 the CPS made a few slight changes to its industrial classification, 
making that year a natural cutoff point. Third, the early 1980s was the beginning 
of the rapid rise in wage and income inequalities as well as the start of the acceleration 
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of several other labor market trends, including globalization, deregulation, the 
spread of computer technology, and the decline in union membership (Kim and 
Sakamoto 2008a). 
As shown in Table 3, the results for the earlier period show that only the coef-
ficients for the fourth and fifth quintiles are statistically significant in the produc-
tivity equation using these industrial-level data. Relative to the marginal produc-
tivity of workers in the omitted category, the marginal productivity of workers in 
the fourth and fifth quintiles are estimated to be 44 percent and 47 percent higher, 
respectively. Because the coefficients for the first and second quintiles are not sta-
tistically significant, we cannot confidently reject the hypothesis that the marginal 
productivities of workers in those quintiles are no different from workers in the 
third quintile. 
In terms of the earnings function for the 1971 to 1982 period, Table 3 shows 
that all of the estimates of the z’s are statistically significant, except for the sec-
ond quintile. The coefficient of .28 for workers in the first quintile indicates that 
they earn 72 percent less than workers in the third quintile. On the other hand, 
the coefficients for the fourth and fifth quintiles indicate that those workers earn 
50 percent and 181 percent more, respectively, than workers in the third quintile. 
For workers in the second quintile, the estimated coefficient is nearly unity and 
is not statistically significant, indicating that the proportion of employees in the 
second quintile does not clearly affect total earnings payments differently from 
the proportion of employees in the third quintile (because their earnings are so 
close during this time period).
In regard to exploitation during the earlier period, Table 3 shows that Wald chi-
square tests are statistically significant for the first and fifth quintiles. For workers 
in the first quintile, the difference between their estimated d (i.e., .87) and z (i.e., .28) 
implies that they are underpaid by 59 percent, which is indicated in Table 3. For 
workers in the fifth quintile, their estimated d (i.e., 1.47) is less than their estimated 
z (i.e., 2.81), implying that they are overpaid by 134 percent.
Table 3 shows that the Wald chi-square test for the difference between productiv-
ity and earnings is not statistically significant for workers in the second and fourth 
quintiles. For these two quintiles, their productivity and earnings differentials are 
approximately equal. The second quintile is about 3 percent lower than the third 
quintile in terms of productivity and earnings, whereas the differential for the 
fourth quintile is about 44 to 50 percent higher. Workers in the second and fourth 
quintiles are thus neither underpaid nor overpaid during the earlier period.
The results in Table 3 for the period 1983 to 1996 are somewhat different. In 
terms of the productivity equation, none of the estimated d’s is statistically signifi-
cant. Most of the estimated d’s are close to unity. Earnings inequalities in the later 
period do not appear to be systematically associated with variations in marginal 
productivities at least when considered at the level of quintiles in the earnings 
distribution using these industrial-level data.
On the other hand, all of the estimated z’s in the earnings equation are statisti-
cally significant for the later period, as shown in Table 3. These findings indicate 
that the quintile distribution across industries is clearly associated with total earn-
ings payments to workers. Relative to the third quintile, earnings is 66 percent 
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lower for the first quintile, 35 percent lower for the second quintile, 29 percent 
higher for the fourth quintile, and 155 percent higher for the fifth quintile.
These results imply high levels of exploitation in the 1983 to 1996 period. For 
the fifth quintile, the difference between its estimated d and z indicates that this 
group is overpaid by 162 percent. For the fourth quintile, the overpayment 
amounts to 28 percent. The two exploited groups are the first and second quintiles 
that are unpaid by 53 percent and 35 percent, respectively. The Wald chi-square 
tests in Table 3 for this later period are statistically significant for each of these 
differentials.
Overall, the findings reported in Table 3 indicate that exploitation increased in 
the later period relative to the earlier period. In the period from 1971 to 1982, the 
statistical significance tests confirmed that only one quintile was clearly overpaid 
(i.e., the fifth) and only one quintile was undoubtedly underpaid (i.e., the first). In 
the period from 1983 to 1996, however, the statistical significance tests indicated 
that two quintiles were overpaid (i.e., the fourth and the fifth) while two quintiles 
were underpaid (i.e., the first and the second). Thus, exploitation increased in the 
later period because the second and fourth quintiles were no longer being paid 
according to their marginal productivities but instead had become either exploited 
or exploiting groups. Although the level of exploitation of the first quintile changed 
only slightly in the later period compared to the earlier period, the exploitative over-
payment of the fifth quintile increased substantially from 134 percent to 162 percent 
(i.e., an increase of 28 percentage points). 
To test the statistical significance of the change in the level of exploitation across 
these two time periods, we calculated a chi-square test statistic for the null hy-
pothesis of no change. For each of the quintiles, the null hypothesis was rejected 
at the .10 level but not at the .05 level. At the .10 level, the increase in the estimated 
level of exploitation for the second quintile is statistically significant, while the 
increases in the level of overpayment for the fourth and fifth quintiles are statisti-
cally significant at that level as well. For the first quintile, the slight decline in the 
level of exploitation across the two time periods is statistically significant at the 
.10 level.
DISCUSSION
The two major parts of our analysis yield compatible results. In the first part, we 
investigated differentials across categories of employees. The findings indicate that 
women, Hispanics, African Americans, and blue-collar workers are substantially 
underpaid relative to their contributions to industrial productivity. In the second 
part, we found that the quintiles associated with higher levels of inequality do 
not always generate correspondingly higher levels of productivity. The fifth quin-
tile was consistently overpaid, while the first quintile was consistently underpaid, 
which may be interpreted as exploitation by relative position in the distribution 
of earnings. Because women, Hispanics, African Americans, and blue-collar work-
ers are more likely to be in lowest quintile and are less likely to be in the highest 
quintile, the conclusions from these two parts of our investigation are consistent 
with each other.
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Despite the obvious significance of ascribed factors in these findings, our results 
further indicate that exploitation is to some extent endemic in the distribution of 
earnings and is thus not limited to women and minorities. Table 2 shows, for ex-
ample, that the rate of exploitation of blue-collar workers is quite high and approx-
imately equal to the rate of exploitation of women. Although space limitations 
prevent us from providing a full descriptive analysis, the majority of our sample 
are non-Hispanic white males and almost two-thirds of them are employed in the 
blue-collar occupational category. Thus, a high level of appropriation is associated 
with non-Hispanic white males simply because they are the largest demographic 
group in the manufacturing sector, and they are mostly employed in blue-collar 
occupations that have a high rate of exploitation.
Regarding the trend in exploitation over time, our findings suggest that exploi-
tation has been increasing in recent years. In the period from 1983 to 1996, the 
second quintile became an exploited group, while the fourth quintile became an 
exploiting group. Furthermore, the fifth quintile substantially increased its level 
of overpayment relative to the period before 1983. These changes in the rates of 
exploitation by quintile are significant at the .10 level (using a two-tailed test) and 
are not theoretically suspect.
This trend towards increasing exploitation may be interpreted in terms of 
Hirsch and De Soucey’s (2006) discussion regarding the role of power in influenc-
ing the economic outcomes associated with organizational restructuring in recent 
years. Rather than reflecting only a rising organizational imperative for greater ef-
ficiency, the increased inequality that has occurred is at least partly a reflection of 
bargaining power differentials between workers. The decline in unions, the falling 
real value of the minimum wage, the increased number of part-time workers, and 
the dismantling of internal labor market practices have all increased inequality 
but may be less important to improving productivity than is usually assumed in 
popular discussions (Kim and Sakamoto 2008b). Rather than being necessary to 
improve productivity, rising inequality in the manufacturing sector may derive 
from the downgrading of the earnings of workers with the least bargaining power, 
who are often women, minorities, and other workers in blue-collar occupations or 
the lower two quintiles of the earnings distribution.
Critical actors in these trends are managers who are typically involved in deci-
sion making regarding personnel, promotions, and organizational restructuring. 
Our finding that managers are the only occupational category that is substantially 
overpaid relative to their productivity underscores their power in the New Econ-
omy (Hirsch and De Soucey 2006). The decline in the returns to firm tenure due to 
reduced earnings growth through internal labor markets (Cappelli 2001) suggests 
a waning of “bureaucratic control” (Edwards 1979) and the increased discretion-
ary power of managerial authority (Gordon 1996). 
Other results in Table 2 indicate that middle-aged workers (i.e., thirty-five to 
fifty-four years of age) and older workers (i.e., fifty-five or more years of age) are 
substantially overpaid and thus may be viewed as exploiters along with manag-
ers. Older workers may have greater personal influence in the firm due to greater 
seniority or organizational authority. They may have the power to affect decision-
making processes in order to obtain wages that exceed their productivities.
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CONCLUSION
Dating back to the work of Karl Marx, the study of inequality has become a well-
established subfield of sociology. Despite the continuing influence of the Marx-
ist perspective on this area of research, however, contemporary sociologists have 
ironically abandoned the empirical analysis of exploitation, which had been cen-
tral to Marx’s concerns. In the foregoing, we have demonstrated that the objective 
investigation of exploitation is entirely feasible, is informative, and need not be es-
chewed by quantitative sociologists. As inequality continues to rise in the United 
States and elsewhere, empirical studies of exploitation are increasingly needed.
We have utilized the Weberian perspective to develop a measure that relies on 
market values given the embeddedness of the existing “market situation.” This 
approach avoids the intractable methodological and theoretical limitations of both 
classical Marxism (which relies on the outdated labor theory of value) and Sø-
rensen’s rent-based analysis (which rests on the dubious notion of perfect market 
competition). Our methodology is not only amenable to empirical investigation 
using currently available data but is also able to identify a critical dimension of 
economic underpayment. Although a related study by Liu et al. (Forthcoming) 
also investigates patterns of economic underpayment and overpayment, their 
analysis does not directly link these phenomena to inequality in the distribution of 
earnings and how the level of inequality has been increasing in recent years. Liu et 
al. (Forthcoming) are furthermore focused on the case of Taiwan. 
In conclusion, our broader research objective has been to promote further research 
and to encourage the development of a broader literature on the sociological study 
of exploitation. We do not argue that our measure represents the only conceivable 
definition. Social stratification research has often focused on describing mobility pat-
terns, assessing how “who gets ahead” is associated with ascribed traits, detailing the 
sources of status attainment, and investigating how occupational structure relates to 
career outcomes. Inadequate attention has been devoted, however, to understanding 
the underlying nature of inequality in the overall distribution of scarce socioeconomic 
rewards. Our investigation has focused on the latter issue and has yielded empirical 
results that suggest the increasing exploitation of disadvantaged workers.
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NOTES
This analysis is unable to identify the underlying source of this gender differential, which 1. 
may involve the segregation of women into less productive manufacturing firms, sex-
typing into detailed occupational titles, comparative worth processes, or unmeasured 
variables such as fewer years of accumulated labor force experience.
The statistical significance tests in Table 2 and Table 3 indicate whether the coefficients 2. 
estimated for our labor force categories are significantly different from unity. The sta-
tistical significance tests of the constant, a, and b show whether they are significantly 
different from zero. 
SOP5301_03.indd   41 3/2/10   2:00:38 PM
42 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES Volume 53, Number 1, 2010
Due to limited degrees of freedom, our specification does not include an interaction 3. 
between marital status and gender. 
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